Analysis of collaborative innovation behavior of megaproject participants under the reward and punishment mechanism
Abstract
Megaprojects are characterized by significant environmental uncertainty and technical complexity, which bring great challenges to engineering construction. Cross-organizational collaborative innovation is an important way to solve these problems. As the main body that understands the difficulties of the construction site and uses innovative products, the participation of megaproject participants is not only conducive to increasing innovation efficiency but also conducive to the application and promotion of innovative achievements. The collaborative innovation behavior of the participants in megaprojects under the reward and punishment incentive mechanism was studied. A game model between different participants was built by combining evolutionary game theory with prospect theory. Then, the dynamic evolution process of the collaborative innovation strategy of participants was analyzed, and the main factors affecting the evolutionary stability strategy of collaborative innovation through numerical simulation were examined. The research results indicate that reward and punishment incentives of collaborative innovation can encourage participants to choose the evolutionary stability strategy of participating in collaborative innovation from both objective and subjective aspects. Factors, such as the cost of participating, the synergy coefficient, the proportion of collaborative revenue distribution, and risk preference, can influence participants’ willingness to engage in collaborative innovation to different degrees.
Keyword : collaborative innovation, megaprojects, participants, reward and punishment mechanism, prospect theory, evolutionary game
How to Cite
Liu, N., & Zhou, G. (2022). Analysis of collaborative innovation behavior of megaproject participants under the reward and punishment mechanism. International Journal of Strategic Property Management, 26(3), 241-257. https://doi.org/10.3846/ijspm.2022.17151
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.
References
Bahadorestani, A., Karlsen, J. T., & Farimani, N. M. (2020). Novel approach to satisfying stakeholders in megaprojects: balancing mutual values. Journal of Management in Engineering, 36(2), 4019047. https://doi.org/10.1061/(ASCE)ME.1943-5479.0000734
Barberis, N. C. (2013). Thirty years of prospect theory in economics: a review and assessment. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 27(1), 173–195. https://doi.org/10.1257/jep.27.1.173
Becker, S. W., & Brownson, F. O. (1964). What price ambiguity? Or the role of ambiguity in decision-making. Journal of Political Economy, 72, 62–73. https://doi.org/10.1086/258854
Brockmann, C., Brezinski, H., & Erbe, A. (2016). Innovation in construction megaprojects. Journal of Construction Engineering and Management, 142(11), 4016059. https://doi.org/10.1061/(ASCE)CO.1943-7862.0001168
Bruzelius, N., Flyvbjerg, B., & Rothengatter, W. (2002). Big decisions, big risks. Improving accountability in mega projects. Transport Policy, 9(2), 143–154. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0967-070X(02)00014-8
Cantarelli, C. C. (2022). Innovation in megaprojects and the role of project complexity. Production Planning & Control, 33(9–10), 943–956. https://doi.org/10.1080/09537287.2020.1837934
Chen, H., Jin, Z., Su, Q., & Yue, G. (2020a). The roles of captains in megaproject innovation ecosystems: the case of the Hong Kong–Zhuhai–Macau Bridge. Engineering, Construction and Architectural Management, 28(3), 662–680. https://doi.org/10.1108/ECAM-01-2020-0076
Chen, H., Zeng, S., & Su, Q. (2020b). Towards management of panoramic innovation in megaprojects: the case of Hong Kong–Zhuhai–Macau Bridge project. Management World, 36(12), 212–227.
Davies, A., MacAulay, S., DeBarro, T., & Thurston, M. (2014). Making innovation happen in a megaproject: London’s Crossrail suburban railway system. Project Management Journal, 45(6), 25–37. https://doi.org/10.1002/pmj.21461
Dodgson, M., Gann, D., & Phillips, N. W. (2014). The Oxford handbook of innovation management. Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199694945.001.0001
Dodgson, M., Gann, D., MacAulay, S., & Davies, A. (2015). Innovation strategy in new transportation systems: the case of Crossrail. Transportation Research Part A: Policy and Practice, 77, 261–275. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tra.2015.04.019
Ercan, T. (2019). New three-part model of innovation activity in construction companies. Journal of Construction Engineering and Management, 145(5), 4019022. https://doi.org/10.1061/(ASCE)CO.1943-7862.0001645
Fan, K., & Hui, E. C. M. (2020). Evolutionary game theory analysis for understanding the decision-making mechanisms of governments and developers on green building incentives. Building and Environment, 179, 106972. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.buildenv.2020.106972
Flyvbjerg, B., Garbuio, M., & Lovallo, D. (2009). Delusion and deception in large infrastructure projects: two models for explaining and preventing executive disaster. California Management Review, 51(2), 170–193. https://doi.org/10.2307/41166485
Friedman, D. (1998). On economic applications of evolutionary game theory. Journal of Evolutionary Economics, 8(1), 15–43. https://doi.org/10.1007/s001910050054
Gao, R., & Liu, J. (2019). Selection of government supervision mode of PPP projects during the operation stage. Construction Management and Economics, 37(10), 584–603. https://doi.org/10.1080/01446193.2018.1564347
Gil, N., Miozzo, M., & Massini, S. (2012). The innovation potential of new infrastructure development: an empirical study of Heathrow airport’s T5 project. Research Policy, 41(2), 452–466. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.respol.2011.10.011
He, H., Zheng, L., & Zhou, G. (2022). Linking users as private partners of utility tunnel public–private partnership projects. Tunnelling and Underground Space Technology, 119, 104249. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tust.2021.104249
Hemström, K., Mahapatra, K., & Gustavsson, L. (2017). Architects’ perception of the innovativeness of the Swedish construction industry. Construction Innovation, 17(2), 244–260. https://doi.org/10.1108/CI-06-2015-0038
Jensen, M. C., & Meckling, W. H. (1976). Theory of the firm: managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure. Journal of Financial Economics, 4(3), 305–360. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-9257-3_8
Kahneman, D., & Tversky, A. (1979). Prospect theory: an analysis of decision under risk. Econometrica, 47(2), 263–291. https://doi.org/10.1142/9789814417358_0006
Kuksov, D., & Wang, K. (2014). The bright side of loss aversion in dynamic and competitive markets. Marketing Science, 33(5), 693–711. https://doi.org/10.1287/mksc.2014.0847
Li, B. Z., & Zeng, J. W. (2021). An analysis of the evolution of government and enterprise interaction in the perspective of resource endowment. Operations Research and Management Science, 30(4), 163–171.
Liu, J., & Ma, G. (2020). Study on incentive and supervision mechanisms of technological innovation in megaprojects based on the principal-agent theory. Engineering, Construction and Architectural Management, 28(6), 1593–1614. https://doi.org/10.1108/ECAM-03-2020-0163
Liu, N., & Zhou, G. (2023). Evolutionary analysis of resource sharing of collaborative innovation in major infrastructure projects based on prospect theory. Journal of Industrial Engineering and Engineering Management, 37(3), 69–79.
Liu, Y., Fan, Z., & Zhang, Y. (2014). Risk decision analysis in emergency response: a method based on cumulative prospect theory. Computers and Operations Research, 42(2), 75–82. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cor.2012.08.008
Ma, G., & Liu, J. (2020). Incentive problem of collaborative technology innovation in mega projects considering fairness preference. Journal of Shanghai University (Natural Science Edition), 5(26), 756–768. https://www.journal.shu.edu.cn/EN/10.12066/j.issn.1007-2861.2122
Manley, K. (2006). The innovation competence of repeat public sector clients in the Australian construction industry. Construction Management and Economics, 24(12), 1295–1304. https://doi.org/10.1080/01446190600934953
Maynard Smith, J., & Price, G. R. (1973). The logic of animal conflict. Nature, 246(5427), 15–18. https://doi.org/10.1038/246015a0
Owolabi, H. A., Oyedele, L. O., Alaka, H. A., Ajayi, S. O., Akinade, O. O., & Bilal, M. (2020). Critical success factors for ensuring bankable completion risk in PFI/PPP megaprojects. Journal of Management in Engineering, 36(1), 4019032. https://doi.org/10.1061/(ASCE)ME.1943-5479.0000717
Ozorhon, B. (2013). Analysis of construction innovation process at project level. Journal of Management in Engineering, 29(4), 455–463. https://doi.org/10.1061/(ASCE)ME.1943-5479.0000157
Ozorhon, B., & Ora, K. (2016). Drivers of innovation in construction projects. Journal of Construction Engineering and Management, 143(4), 4016118. https://doi.org/10.1061/(ASCE)CO.1943-7862.0001234
Romestant, F. (2020). Sustainability agencing: the involvement of stakeholder networks in megaprojects. Industrial Marketing Management, 89, 535–549. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.indmarman.2019.09.005
Sergeeva, N., & Zanello, C. (2018). Championing and promoting innovation in UK megaprojects. International Journal of Project Management, 36(8), 1068–1081. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijproman.2018.09.002
Simon, H. A. (1955). A behavioral model of rational choice. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 69(1), 99–118. https://doi.org/10.2307/1884852
Slaughter, E. S. (1998). Models of construction innovation. Journal of Construction Engineering and Management, 124(3), 226–231. https://doi.org/10.1061/(ASCE)0733-9364(1998)124:3(226)
Smith, J. M. (1974). The theory of games and the evolution of animal conflicts. Journal of Theoretical Biology, 47(1), 209–221. https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-5193(74)90110-6
Song, Y., Elsner, W., Zhang, Z., & Berger, R. (2020). Collaborative innovation and policy support: the emergence of trilateral networks. Applied Economics, 52(34), 3651–3668. https://doi.org/10.1080/00036846.2019.1708254
Tan, D., & Xu, H. (2020). Evolutionary equilibrium analysis of mass emergency derived from environmental pollution based on prospect theory. Operations Research and Management Science, 29(5), 161–170.
Tatum, C. B. (2018). Learning construction engineering: why, what, and how. Journal of Construction Engineering and Management, 144(3), 4018004. https://doi.org/10.1061/(ASCE)CO.1943-7862.0001436
Turner, J. R., & Müller, R. (2003). On the nature of the project as a temporary organization. International Journal of Project Management, 21(1), 1–8. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0263-7863(02)00020-0
Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1992). Advances in prospect theory: cumulative representation of uncertainty. Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 5(4), 297–323. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00122574
van Marrewijk, A., Clegg, S. R., Pitsis, T. S., & Veenswijk, M. (2008). Managing public–private megaprojects: paradoxes, complexity, and project design. International Journal of Project Management, 26(6), 591–600. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijproman.2007.09.007
von Neumann, J., & Morgenstern, O. (1944). Theory of games and economic behavior. Princeton University Press.
Winch, G. M. (2013). Escalation in major projects: lessons from the channel fixed link. International Journal of Project Management, 31(5), 724–734. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijproman.2013.01.012
Worsnop, T., Miraglia, S., & Davies, A. (2016). Balancing open and closed innovation in megaprojects: insights from Crossrail. Project Management Journal, 47(4), 79–94. https://doi.org/10.1177/875697281604700407
Wu, J., Wu, X., Li, P., Sheng, Y., & Shi, Q. (2017). Evolutionary game analysis of knowledge transfer in industry alliance based on cumulative prospect theory. Operations Research and Management Science, 26(3), 92–99.
Xue, F., Chen, G., Xie, H., & Zhang, L. (2021). Incentive contract design for collaborative innovation of megaproject under moral hazard. Systems Engineering, 39(4), 49–55.
Zeng, W., Wang, H., Li, H., Zhou, H., Wu, P., & Le, Y. (2019). Incentive mechanisms for supplier development in mega construction projects. IEEE Transactions on Engineering Management, 66(2), 252–265. https://doi.org/10.1109/TEM.2018.2808169
Zhang, H., Wang, J., & Tao, H. (2018). Research the decision-making behavior of investors based on prospect theory in the PPP Project. Soft Science, 32(8), 129–133. https://doi.org/10.13956/j.ss.1001-8409.2018.08.28
Zhang, J., & Liu, M. (2017). Supervise management on collusion between government and enterprise in water pollution control based on prospect theory. System Engineering, 35(2), 45–50.
Zhang, Y., Donohue, K., & Cui, T. H. (2015). Contract preferences and performance for the loss-averse supplier: buyback versus revenue sharing. Management Science, 62(6), 1734–1754. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2015.2182
Zhao, D., Ji, S., Wang, H., & Jiang, L. (2021). How do government subsidies promote new energy vehicle diffusion in the complex network context? A three-stage evolutionary game model. Energy, 230, 120899. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.energy.2021.120899
Zhou, G., Zhang, Y., Li, Y., & Zhao, G. (2012). Evolutionary game analysis of the behavior of construction safety management based on prospect theory. Journal of Systems and Management, 21(4), 501–509. https://doi.org/10.3969/j.issn.1005-2542.2012.04.009
Zhou, Y., & Liu, J. (2021). Influence of government credit risk on PPP projects in operation stage. International Journal of Strategic Property Management, 25(3), 216–227. https://doi.org/10.3846/ijspm.2021.14552
Zhu, Y. (2017). The Sichuan—Tibet railway construction challenges and countermeasures. China Communications Press.
Barberis, N. C. (2013). Thirty years of prospect theory in economics: a review and assessment. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 27(1), 173–195. https://doi.org/10.1257/jep.27.1.173
Becker, S. W., & Brownson, F. O. (1964). What price ambiguity? Or the role of ambiguity in decision-making. Journal of Political Economy, 72, 62–73. https://doi.org/10.1086/258854
Brockmann, C., Brezinski, H., & Erbe, A. (2016). Innovation in construction megaprojects. Journal of Construction Engineering and Management, 142(11), 4016059. https://doi.org/10.1061/(ASCE)CO.1943-7862.0001168
Bruzelius, N., Flyvbjerg, B., & Rothengatter, W. (2002). Big decisions, big risks. Improving accountability in mega projects. Transport Policy, 9(2), 143–154. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0967-070X(02)00014-8
Cantarelli, C. C. (2022). Innovation in megaprojects and the role of project complexity. Production Planning & Control, 33(9–10), 943–956. https://doi.org/10.1080/09537287.2020.1837934
Chen, H., Jin, Z., Su, Q., & Yue, G. (2020a). The roles of captains in megaproject innovation ecosystems: the case of the Hong Kong–Zhuhai–Macau Bridge. Engineering, Construction and Architectural Management, 28(3), 662–680. https://doi.org/10.1108/ECAM-01-2020-0076
Chen, H., Zeng, S., & Su, Q. (2020b). Towards management of panoramic innovation in megaprojects: the case of Hong Kong–Zhuhai–Macau Bridge project. Management World, 36(12), 212–227.
Davies, A., MacAulay, S., DeBarro, T., & Thurston, M. (2014). Making innovation happen in a megaproject: London’s Crossrail suburban railway system. Project Management Journal, 45(6), 25–37. https://doi.org/10.1002/pmj.21461
Dodgson, M., Gann, D., & Phillips, N. W. (2014). The Oxford handbook of innovation management. Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199694945.001.0001
Dodgson, M., Gann, D., MacAulay, S., & Davies, A. (2015). Innovation strategy in new transportation systems: the case of Crossrail. Transportation Research Part A: Policy and Practice, 77, 261–275. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tra.2015.04.019
Ercan, T. (2019). New three-part model of innovation activity in construction companies. Journal of Construction Engineering and Management, 145(5), 4019022. https://doi.org/10.1061/(ASCE)CO.1943-7862.0001645
Fan, K., & Hui, E. C. M. (2020). Evolutionary game theory analysis for understanding the decision-making mechanisms of governments and developers on green building incentives. Building and Environment, 179, 106972. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.buildenv.2020.106972
Flyvbjerg, B., Garbuio, M., & Lovallo, D. (2009). Delusion and deception in large infrastructure projects: two models for explaining and preventing executive disaster. California Management Review, 51(2), 170–193. https://doi.org/10.2307/41166485
Friedman, D. (1998). On economic applications of evolutionary game theory. Journal of Evolutionary Economics, 8(1), 15–43. https://doi.org/10.1007/s001910050054
Gao, R., & Liu, J. (2019). Selection of government supervision mode of PPP projects during the operation stage. Construction Management and Economics, 37(10), 584–603. https://doi.org/10.1080/01446193.2018.1564347
Gil, N., Miozzo, M., & Massini, S. (2012). The innovation potential of new infrastructure development: an empirical study of Heathrow airport’s T5 project. Research Policy, 41(2), 452–466. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.respol.2011.10.011
He, H., Zheng, L., & Zhou, G. (2022). Linking users as private partners of utility tunnel public–private partnership projects. Tunnelling and Underground Space Technology, 119, 104249. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tust.2021.104249
Hemström, K., Mahapatra, K., & Gustavsson, L. (2017). Architects’ perception of the innovativeness of the Swedish construction industry. Construction Innovation, 17(2), 244–260. https://doi.org/10.1108/CI-06-2015-0038
Jensen, M. C., & Meckling, W. H. (1976). Theory of the firm: managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure. Journal of Financial Economics, 4(3), 305–360. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-9257-3_8
Kahneman, D., & Tversky, A. (1979). Prospect theory: an analysis of decision under risk. Econometrica, 47(2), 263–291. https://doi.org/10.1142/9789814417358_0006
Kuksov, D., & Wang, K. (2014). The bright side of loss aversion in dynamic and competitive markets. Marketing Science, 33(5), 693–711. https://doi.org/10.1287/mksc.2014.0847
Li, B. Z., & Zeng, J. W. (2021). An analysis of the evolution of government and enterprise interaction in the perspective of resource endowment. Operations Research and Management Science, 30(4), 163–171.
Liu, J., & Ma, G. (2020). Study on incentive and supervision mechanisms of technological innovation in megaprojects based on the principal-agent theory. Engineering, Construction and Architectural Management, 28(6), 1593–1614. https://doi.org/10.1108/ECAM-03-2020-0163
Liu, N., & Zhou, G. (2023). Evolutionary analysis of resource sharing of collaborative innovation in major infrastructure projects based on prospect theory. Journal of Industrial Engineering and Engineering Management, 37(3), 69–79.
Liu, Y., Fan, Z., & Zhang, Y. (2014). Risk decision analysis in emergency response: a method based on cumulative prospect theory. Computers and Operations Research, 42(2), 75–82. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cor.2012.08.008
Ma, G., & Liu, J. (2020). Incentive problem of collaborative technology innovation in mega projects considering fairness preference. Journal of Shanghai University (Natural Science Edition), 5(26), 756–768. https://www.journal.shu.edu.cn/EN/10.12066/j.issn.1007-2861.2122
Manley, K. (2006). The innovation competence of repeat public sector clients in the Australian construction industry. Construction Management and Economics, 24(12), 1295–1304. https://doi.org/10.1080/01446190600934953
Maynard Smith, J., & Price, G. R. (1973). The logic of animal conflict. Nature, 246(5427), 15–18. https://doi.org/10.1038/246015a0
Owolabi, H. A., Oyedele, L. O., Alaka, H. A., Ajayi, S. O., Akinade, O. O., & Bilal, M. (2020). Critical success factors for ensuring bankable completion risk in PFI/PPP megaprojects. Journal of Management in Engineering, 36(1), 4019032. https://doi.org/10.1061/(ASCE)ME.1943-5479.0000717
Ozorhon, B. (2013). Analysis of construction innovation process at project level. Journal of Management in Engineering, 29(4), 455–463. https://doi.org/10.1061/(ASCE)ME.1943-5479.0000157
Ozorhon, B., & Ora, K. (2016). Drivers of innovation in construction projects. Journal of Construction Engineering and Management, 143(4), 4016118. https://doi.org/10.1061/(ASCE)CO.1943-7862.0001234
Romestant, F. (2020). Sustainability agencing: the involvement of stakeholder networks in megaprojects. Industrial Marketing Management, 89, 535–549. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.indmarman.2019.09.005
Sergeeva, N., & Zanello, C. (2018). Championing and promoting innovation in UK megaprojects. International Journal of Project Management, 36(8), 1068–1081. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijproman.2018.09.002
Simon, H. A. (1955). A behavioral model of rational choice. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 69(1), 99–118. https://doi.org/10.2307/1884852
Slaughter, E. S. (1998). Models of construction innovation. Journal of Construction Engineering and Management, 124(3), 226–231. https://doi.org/10.1061/(ASCE)0733-9364(1998)124:3(226)
Smith, J. M. (1974). The theory of games and the evolution of animal conflicts. Journal of Theoretical Biology, 47(1), 209–221. https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-5193(74)90110-6
Song, Y., Elsner, W., Zhang, Z., & Berger, R. (2020). Collaborative innovation and policy support: the emergence of trilateral networks. Applied Economics, 52(34), 3651–3668. https://doi.org/10.1080/00036846.2019.1708254
Tan, D., & Xu, H. (2020). Evolutionary equilibrium analysis of mass emergency derived from environmental pollution based on prospect theory. Operations Research and Management Science, 29(5), 161–170.
Tatum, C. B. (2018). Learning construction engineering: why, what, and how. Journal of Construction Engineering and Management, 144(3), 4018004. https://doi.org/10.1061/(ASCE)CO.1943-7862.0001436
Turner, J. R., & Müller, R. (2003). On the nature of the project as a temporary organization. International Journal of Project Management, 21(1), 1–8. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0263-7863(02)00020-0
Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1992). Advances in prospect theory: cumulative representation of uncertainty. Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 5(4), 297–323. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00122574
van Marrewijk, A., Clegg, S. R., Pitsis, T. S., & Veenswijk, M. (2008). Managing public–private megaprojects: paradoxes, complexity, and project design. International Journal of Project Management, 26(6), 591–600. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijproman.2007.09.007
von Neumann, J., & Morgenstern, O. (1944). Theory of games and economic behavior. Princeton University Press.
Winch, G. M. (2013). Escalation in major projects: lessons from the channel fixed link. International Journal of Project Management, 31(5), 724–734. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijproman.2013.01.012
Worsnop, T., Miraglia, S., & Davies, A. (2016). Balancing open and closed innovation in megaprojects: insights from Crossrail. Project Management Journal, 47(4), 79–94. https://doi.org/10.1177/875697281604700407
Wu, J., Wu, X., Li, P., Sheng, Y., & Shi, Q. (2017). Evolutionary game analysis of knowledge transfer in industry alliance based on cumulative prospect theory. Operations Research and Management Science, 26(3), 92–99.
Xue, F., Chen, G., Xie, H., & Zhang, L. (2021). Incentive contract design for collaborative innovation of megaproject under moral hazard. Systems Engineering, 39(4), 49–55.
Zeng, W., Wang, H., Li, H., Zhou, H., Wu, P., & Le, Y. (2019). Incentive mechanisms for supplier development in mega construction projects. IEEE Transactions on Engineering Management, 66(2), 252–265. https://doi.org/10.1109/TEM.2018.2808169
Zhang, H., Wang, J., & Tao, H. (2018). Research the decision-making behavior of investors based on prospect theory in the PPP Project. Soft Science, 32(8), 129–133. https://doi.org/10.13956/j.ss.1001-8409.2018.08.28
Zhang, J., & Liu, M. (2017). Supervise management on collusion between government and enterprise in water pollution control based on prospect theory. System Engineering, 35(2), 45–50.
Zhang, Y., Donohue, K., & Cui, T. H. (2015). Contract preferences and performance for the loss-averse supplier: buyback versus revenue sharing. Management Science, 62(6), 1734–1754. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2015.2182
Zhao, D., Ji, S., Wang, H., & Jiang, L. (2021). How do government subsidies promote new energy vehicle diffusion in the complex network context? A three-stage evolutionary game model. Energy, 230, 120899. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.energy.2021.120899
Zhou, G., Zhang, Y., Li, Y., & Zhao, G. (2012). Evolutionary game analysis of the behavior of construction safety management based on prospect theory. Journal of Systems and Management, 21(4), 501–509. https://doi.org/10.3969/j.issn.1005-2542.2012.04.009
Zhou, Y., & Liu, J. (2021). Influence of government credit risk on PPP projects in operation stage. International Journal of Strategic Property Management, 25(3), 216–227. https://doi.org/10.3846/ijspm.2021.14552
Zhu, Y. (2017). The Sichuan—Tibet railway construction challenges and countermeasures. China Communications Press.